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STRETCHING ARMSTRONG: HOW THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
INCORRECTLY APPLIED SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN 
DOES V. GILLESPIE 
ABSTRACT 
Medicaid serves as an important source of health insurance for millions of 
Americans. One of the Act’s core tenants is the patient’s freedom to choose from 
any qualified and willing provider. This “freedom of choice” provision was 
eventually codified, and subsequent protections were put in place to protect a 
patient’s choice regarding family planning services. However, as states attempt 
to limit access to family planning services by severing their Medicaid contracts 
with Planned Parenthood, patients must rely on § 1983 to pursue relief in federal 
courts. Section 1983 provides a right of action for the violation of any federal 
right or law. Courts have routinely allowed Medicaid patients to use § 1983 to 
access federal court. In fact, five circuit courts of appeals have all held the 
freedom of choice provision creates a right that can be enforced in federal court. 
Unfortunately, however, the Eighth Circuit in Does v. Gillespie held otherwise 
by incorrectly applying Supreme Court precedent. This created a circuit split to 
position Does to be the case that gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to 
potentially close the door on all § 1983 private rights of action in Medicaid 
cases. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Medicaid was initially passed in 1965, and since then, it has been a staple of 
the American health care system.1 One of the core tenets of Medicaid is the 
patient’s freedom to choose from any qualified provider offering medical 
services.2 In the first two years after its enactment, there was evidence that states 
were limiting beneficiaries’ access to health care by funneling patients to certain 
government facilities and restricting payments to providers.3 This ran counter to 
Medicaid’s goal of expanding access to health care.4 Accordingly, in 1967, 
Congress enacted a provision solidifying patients’ ability to choose from any 
qualified and willing provider.5 Codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A), the 
provision has become known as the “free choice of provider” or “freedom of 
choice” provision.6 
During the rise of Medicaid managed care plans, Congress authorized the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to waive the freedom of choice 
provision and allow states to utilize risk-based managed care plans for Medicaid 
beneficiaries.7 This proved problematic in relation to family planning services, 
because religious plans refused to include family planning services in their 
agreements and many traditional family planning providers were excluded from 
managed care networks.8 In response, Congress amended the statute to explicitly 
preserve patients’ freedom of choice for family planning services.9 
This additional protection of patient choice has been in place since 1986,10 
though states have recently attempted to limit access to family planning services 
by removing funding from Planned Parenthood.11 Several states have tried to cut 
 
 1. See Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and 
Its Origins, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 45, 45 (2005). 
 2. Laura Cartwright-Smith & Sarah Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Free-Choice-of-Provider 
Protections in a Family Planning Context: Planned Parenthood Federation of Indiana v. 
Commissioner of the Indiana State Department of Health, 127 PUB. HEALTH REP. 119, 120 (2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Medicaid Managed Care and the Family Planning Free-Choice 
Exemption: Beyond the Freedom to Choose, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y AND L. 1191, 1193–94 
(1997). 
 8. Id. at 1196. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B) (2012); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 7, at 1196 (explaining 
how the Secretary of HHS was no longer able to use utilize freedom of choice waivers for family 
planning services in the managed care context). 
 10. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 7, at 1196. 
 11. Kinsey Hasstedt, Understanding Planned Parenthood’s Critical Role in the Nation’s 
Family Planning Safety Net, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2017). 
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off state funding by ending their Medicaid contracts with the organization,12 
which is the predominant source of family planning services for many women.13 
Accordingly, threats to funding for Planned Parenthood serve as direct threats to 
patient choice for women all across the U.S. 
Enforcement of the freedom of choice provision, however, has proved 
difficult. The Secretary of HHS has limited enforcement authority to force states 
into compliance with the provision, and the Medicaid Act lacks sufficient 
administrative remedies to address violations of patient choice. That leaves 
Medicaid patients to seek redress in federal court for state violations of the 
freedom of choice provision. Fortunately, federal appellate courts have routinely 
held the freedom of choice provision provides an individual right that can be 
enforced in federal court under § 1983.14 
In a recent decision, however, the Eighth Circuit held patients cannot use 
§ 1983 to enforce the provision.15 Rather than follow the analysis of its sister 
courts, the Eighth Circuit relied on language from a rather curious Supreme 
Court case,16 one analyzing claims arising under the Supremacy Clause and not 
§ 1983.17 The Eighth Circuit applied the incorrect rules of statutory 
interpretation for analyzing § 1983 claims, particularly in relation to Medicaid. 
In so doing, the court supplanted binding precedent with dicta. Accordingly, the 
court in Does wrongly held the Supreme Court overturned its own precedent, 
effectively re-writing well-established, long applied § 1983 analysis for 
Medicaid cases and setting up a circuit split to position Does to be the case that 
gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to potentially close the door on all 
§1983 private rights of action in Medicaid cases. 
II.  MEDICAID AND THE IMPORTANCE OF § 1983 PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
Medicaid is the nation’s public health insurance program for people with 
low income, and it covers more than seventy million Americans.18 Program 
participants include children and their parents, pregnant woman, frail elderly 
 
 12. Jackie Calmes, States Move to Cut Funds for Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/states-move-to-cut-funds-for-planned-parent 
hood.html. 
 13. See Hasstedt, supra note 11. 
 14. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. 
v. Ind. State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. 
Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 
F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2017); Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th 
Cir. 2018). But see Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 15. Does, 867 F.3d at 1046. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015). 
 18. KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID POCKET PRIMER 1 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attach 
mentFact-Sheet-Medicaid-Pocket-Primer. 
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individuals, and people with certain disabilities.19 Since its inception, Medicaid 
has evolved to reflect certain federal policy goals.20 Once such goal was 
allowing Medicaid patients to choose their care, rather than requiring they use 
certain access points selected by state governments.21 Accordingly, Medicaid’s 
“free choice of provider” or “freedom of choice” provision was added to the Act 
through an amendment in 1967.22 
Despite serving as an important protection for patients, forcing a state to 
comply with the freedom of choice provision is difficult. HHS has some 
enforcement power, but HHS remedies are limited and counterproductive. 
Further, although the Medicaid Act includes administrative appeals processes 
for patients, they are not adequate to address attacks on patients’ freedom of 
choice. Accordingly, when a patient’s choice has been restricted by the state, her 
only avenue is to seek redress in federal court. Thus, it is imperative for courts 
to keep their doors open to Medicaid patients seeking to enforce the right to the 
provider of their choice. 
A. Medicaid is a Cooperative Federal-State Program 
Medicaid operates as a cooperative federal-state program; the federal 
government provides matching funds to states that agree to abide by the 
requirements of the Medicaid Act.23 Essentially, the federal government 
promises federal funding to states in exchange for the states’ promise to provide 
medical assistance to mandatory categories of people.24 
The freedom of choice provision was added to Medicaid in 1967 in response 
to states restricting beneficiaries’ access to health care providers and facilities of 
the states’ choosing. 25 Largely unchanged since it was first added, the freedom 
of choice provision states: “[A]ny individual eligible for medical assistance … 
may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, 
or person, qualified to perform the service or services required who undertakes 
to provide him such services[.]”26 
As federal policy changed through the years and Medicaid evolved to cover 
more people and services, the freedom of choice provision automatically applied 
 
 19. MACPAC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 3 (2017), https://www.mac 
pac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/June-2017-Report-to-Congress-on-Medicaid-and-CHIP.pdf. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Nicole Huberfeld, Where There Is a Right, There Must Be a Remedy - Even in Medicaid, 
102 KY. L.J. 327, 329 (2013). 
 24. Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and 
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2008). 
 25. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2012). 
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to these new services.27 That freedom has only been limited in one context: 
Medicaid managed care.28 Managed care plans allow a state to contract with a 
limited selection of health care providers to deliver care to plan enrollees.29 
Patients’ freedom of choice must be limited to some degree for these programs 
to work.  
Despite that limitation, Congress has explicitly preserved patients’ freedom 
of choice in the context of family planning services.30 Thus, Medicaid 
beneficiaries have the right to freely choose among qualified and willing family 
planning providers, even if participating in a Medicaid managed care plan, and 
that right cannot be altered by the state.31 This illustrates Congress’s pledge to 
allow Medicaid beneficiaries unfettered access to the provider of their choice for 
sensitive services without fear of state intervention.32 
This protection, however, has been challenged by the recent trend of states 
terminating Medicaid provider agreements with Planned Parenthood.33 It begs 
the question: how can Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision be enforced 
against noncompliant states?  
B. HHS has Limited Enforcement Power 
Unfortunately, HHS is reluctant to use its enforcement power to force states 
to comply with Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision. The Medicaid Act 
directly addresses what should happen if a state fails to adhere to its own plan.34 
It permits the Secretary of HHS to withdraw full or partial funding from states 
that fail to comply with the required provisions of the Act.35 This remedy only 
comes into effect after the Secretary has given the state reasonable notice and 
opportunity for a hearing.36  
This enforcement mechanism, however, does nothing to help the Medicaid 
patient who has been denied access to the provider of her choice. In fact, the 
withdrawal of funding only serves to exacerbate her problem. Not only has her 
right to the provider of her choice been violated, but also now the state likely 
lacks the funds necessary to provide other needed services. The patient’s 
 
 27. MACPAC, supra note 19; Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2. 
 28. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2. 
 29. Medicaid Managed Care Market Tracker, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/ 
data-collection/medicaid-managed-care-market-tracker/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B) (2012). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2. 
 33. See Roxana Hegeman, Court: Kansas Can’t Cut Medicaid Funds to Planned Parenthood, 
ABC NEWS (Feb 21, 2018), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/court-kansas-cut-medicaid-
funds-planned-parenthood-53260383. 
 34. Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 327. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). 
 36. Id. 
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problem has doubled. She cannot choose her provider, nor can she obtain other 
necessary services. Accordingly, the withdrawal of funding has been deemed the 
“nuclear option” because of the harm it would cause to program enrollees, and 
HHS has never seriously considered employing it.37 
Although HHS has some authority to affect how states administer their 
Medicaid programs, it does not help those beneficiaries who have had their 
freedom of choice violated. 
C. The Medicaid Statute Provides Limited Remedies for Patients and 
Providers 
Furthermore, the Medicaid Act does not provide a sufficient remedy for 
patients within the statute itself.38 Although it does provide administrative 
procedures for patients and providers in certain circumstances, they do not 
adequately address concerns arising from the violation of a patient’s freedom of 
choice. 
The Act requires states to provide program beneficiaries with the 
opportunity for a fair hearing if their claim for medical assistance is denied or 
not acted upon with reasonable promptness.39 This includes any action, or 
inaction, that affects the person’s eligibility during the initial application process 
or the termination of a particular medical service covered by the program.40 The 
two main issues covered by these hearings include applicants appealing the 
denial of their eligibility and beneficiaries seeking review for the decision to 
deny or discontinue a particular service.41 HHS, however, has specified that 
states are not obligated to grant such a hearing where the only issue is a state law 
requiring an automatic change adversely affecting some or all beneficiaries.42 
Thus, beneficiaries challenging a state amendment to its Medicaid plan are not 
entitled to a hearing at all if they fail to raise a factual dispute regarding their 
eligibility for coverage.43 Accordingly, the fair hearing process does absolutely 
nothing to help the patient whose provider has been excluded from the Medicaid 
program. 
For example, take a Medicaid patient who sees the same physician at a 
Planned Parenthood clinic for contraceptive counseling each year. Unbeknownst 
to her, the state decides to cancel its provider contract with the clinic, and she 
can no longer obtain the needed services from the provider of her choice. Her 
claim for contraceptive counseling from that provider will be denied. The patient 
 
 37. See Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 327. 
 38. See id. at 328. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2018). 
 40. MaryBeth Musumeci, A Guide to the Medicaid Appeals Process, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 6 
(2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8287.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b) (2018). 
 43. Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 253 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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can attempt to appeal the denial, but she will be unsuccessful. Although the state 
amended its Medicaid plan, which adversely affected some beneficiaries, the 
patient’s Medicaid eligibility has not been altered in any way. Thus, the state is 
not required to offer the patient a fair hearing at all.44 If the patient is somehow 
able to secure a hearing, her appeal is still likely to fail. Her Medicaid eligibility 
is still intact, and the state did not terminate contraceptive counseling all 
together.45 The patient still has access to the services she needs—so long as she 
obtains it from a different provider. This is exactly the type of result the freedom 
of choice provision was added to prevent. She has clearly lost her freedom to 
choose her health care provider, but none of the Act’s administrative remedies 
help her regain that choice. Thus, the Medicaid program itself offers no recourse 
to patients trying to secure their right to choose. 
Furthermore, the Act requires states to provide an appeals process to those 
providers that have been excluded from a state’s Medicaid program.46 Thus, if a 
state terminates its provider agreement with a particular provider or group of 
providers, they have the right to appeal the decision.47 This right to appeal, 
however, only extends to affected providers.48 The patient cannot appeal the 
exclusion on behalf of her provider.49 She is left hoping her provider appeals the 
exclusion and that the appeal is granted. There is no affirmative action she can 
take to ensure her freedom of choice is protected. Therefore again, this remedy 
is insufficient to address violations of a patient’s freedom of choice. 
Although there are two administrative mechanisms within the Medicaid Act 
patients and providers can utilize to challenge agency decisions, these processes 
do not adequately address those situations when a patient’s freedom of choice 
has been violated. 
D. The Supremacy Clause is not the Source of any Federal Right 
Because HHS and the Medicaid Act offer no remedy for patients when their 
freedom of choice has been violated, federal court is the only forum where 
patients can seek relief.  Private individuals have often gone to federal court to 
obtain relief when they are being harmed by state actions that are inconsistent 
with federal law.50 Medicaid beneficiaries have enforced various provisions of 
the Medicaid Act against state violators in federal court under the Supremacy 
 
 44. 42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b) (2018). 
 45. See Musumeci, supra note 40. 
 46. 42 C.F.R. § 1002.213 (2018). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. JANE PERKINS, UPDATE ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEDICAID ACT: THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 1 (2014), 
http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/Issue-brief-medicaid-supremacy-
clause#.WdAdWRNSzok 
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Clause or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983).51 Recently, however, the Supreme Court 
foreclosed the use of the Supremacy Clause to challenge state actions that 
conflict with federal law.52 Accordingly, Medicaid beneficiaries are left with 
only one option for federal enforcement when their freedom of choice has been 
violated: challenge the state action in federal court under § 1983. Access to 
federal court is vital for Medicaid patients, particularly when their freedom of 
choice has been violated by the state, and these types of fights are more suited 
for federal court. 
Thus, a federal forum is more appropriate to resolve these disputes. As 
discussed below, many Medicaid provisions have been enforced through § 1983.  
III.  THE PATH TO A SUCCESSFUL CLAIM UNDER § 1983 
Title 42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code is one of America’s oldest federal 
laws, dating back to the Reconstruction Era.53 The statute provides:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress …54 
It effectively offers an express cause of action to individuals when a state actor 
deprives them of rights guaranteed under federal law.55 Many claimants file 
§ 1983 lawsuits, including recipients of various public benefits.56 There are a 
plethora of cases regarding disability benefits,57 veterans’ benefits,58 retirement 
 
 51. Jane Perkins, Pin the Tail on the Donkey: Beneficiary Enforcement of the Medicaid Act 
over Time, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 207, 208 (2016). 
 52. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383–84 (2015) (explaining 
the Supremacy Clause is not the “source” of any federal rights and “certainly” does not create a 
cause of action, as it only instructs courts house to deal with conflicting state and federal laws). 
 53. Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 331. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (2018). 
 55. Perkins, supra note 51, at 217. 
 56. Other claimants include alleged victims of police misconduct; prisoners; present and 
former public employees; and property owners. Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, FED. 
JUD. CTR. 3 (2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Section-1983-Litigation-3D-FJC-
Schwartz-2014.pdf. 
 57. See, e.g., Miller v. Tex. Tech. Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 352 n.3 (5th Cir. 
2005) (alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students); Cryder v. 
Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 176 (11th Cir. 1994) (regarding termination of disability benefits in 
accordance with the state’s worker’s compensation law). 
 58. See, e.g., Mehrkens v. Blank, 556 F.3d 865, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2009) (claiming the 
Department of Veteran’s Affairs withheld treatment owed as part of veterans’ benefits); Mathes v. 
Hornbarger, 821 F.2d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 1987) (regarding Veterans Affairs educational benefits). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] STRETCHING ARMSTRONG 223 
benefits,59 and unemployment compensation benefits.60 These cases typically 
present in three ways: (1) an individual is denied certain federal benefits;61 (2) a 
state enacts a law limiting federal benefits to some degree;62 or (3) a state does 
not provide federal benefits in a manner consistent with federal law.63 
Historically, low-income individuals have greatly relied upon § 1983 to ensure 
federal rights enshrined by Congress are fully realized.64 The enforcement of 
various provisions of the Medicaid Act has been no exception.65 
The Supreme Court has held patients may bring § 1983 actions to force 
states to comply with certain provisions of the Medicaid Act.66 In Maine v. 
Thiboutot, the Court stated § 1983 applies to alleged violations of federal 
statutes, not just violations of the Constitution.67 The phrase “and laws” in 
§ 1983 was construed to cover any federal law, not merely civil rights or equal 
protection laws as had been previously assumed.68 Shortly thereafter in Wilder 
v. Virgina Hospital Association, the Court concluded a provision of the 
Medicaid Act could be enforced in federal court through § 1983.69 This decision 
effectively pushed open the courthouse doors to Medicaid litigation against 
states.70 
Subsequent jurisprudence has clarified the requirements for a successful 
§ 1983 claim. First, a federal statute is only enforceable under § 1983 if the 
plaintiff asserts a violation of a federal right, not just a violation of a federal 
law.71 As noted by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, the 
determination of whether a statutory provision creates a federal right turns on a 
three factors.72 Frequently referred to as the “Blessing test,” the provision must 
(1) be intended to benefit the plaintiff; (2) be written with sufficient clarity such 
that a court can enforce it; and (3) impose a binding obligation on states.73 When 
 
 59. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(concerning retirement benefits awarded to retired Rhode Island legislators and their beneficiaries). 
 60. See, e.g., Zambrano v. Reinert, 291 F.3d 964, 966 (7th Cir. 2002) (concerning an employee 
that had been denied unemployment compensation benefits in accordance with state law). 
 61. See, e.g., Mathes, 821 F.2d at 440 (regarding Veterans Affairs educational benefits). 
 62. See, e.g., Zambrano, 291 F.3d at 966 (concerning an employee that had been denied 
unemployment compensation benefits in accordance with state law). 
 63. See, e.g., Miller v. Tex. Tech. Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 352 n.3 (5th Cir. 
2005) (alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students). 
 64. Perkins, supra note 51, at 217. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 223. 
 67. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
 68. Id. at 6. 
 69. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (holding the Boren Amendment 
gave health care providers an enforceable right to reasonable reimbursement rates). 
 70. Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 333. 
 71. Schwartz, supra note 56, at 75. 
 72. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997). 
 73. Id. 
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all three factors are present, the right is presumed to be enforceable.74 That 
presumption, however, can be overcome by demonstrating Congress expressly 
foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 in the statute itself or by creating an individual 
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under 
§ 1983.75 This fairly straightforward analytical framework has been applied to 
Medicaid’s various provisions with consistent results.76 
A. Provision Must be Intended to Benefit the Plaintiff 
The first prong of the Blessing test requires the provision at issue be intended 
to benefit the plaintiff.77 The key inquiry is whether a specific statutory 
provision, not the legislation as a whole, gives rise to rights.78 Courts conduct a 
two-part analysis to determine whether this prong has been met. 
First, as noted in Gonzaga University v. Doe, only “unambiguously 
conferred” rights can support a cause of action under § 1983.79 Section 1983 
provides a remedy for the deprivation of rights secured by the laws of the United 
States.80 Therefore, it can only be used to enforce rights, not such broad or vague 
concepts as benefits or interests.81 For a right to be “unambiguously conferred,” 
the text and structure of a statute must indicate Congress intended to create new 
individual rights.82 
Second, the provision must have an individual rather than aggregate focus, 
because provisions with an aggregate focus cannot give rise to individual federal 
rights.83 For example, statutory provisions mandating “substantial compliance” 
with federal legislation have an aggregate focus because they are typically only 
concerned with system-wide performance of a state’s program.84 Moreover, 
provisions speaking only in terms of institutional policy or practice also have an 
aggregate focus because they are not designed to address the needs of any 
particular person.85  
Following these principles, the Third Circuit held a Medicaid provision 
requiring state plans to provide medical assistance with “reasonable promptness 
to all eligible individuals” clearly satisfied the first prong of the Blessing test.86 
 
 74. Perkins, supra note 51, at 219. 
 75. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342; see also Perkins, supra note 51, at 219. 
 76. Perkins, supra note 51, at 222–24. 
 77. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. 
 78. Id. at 342. 
 79. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 285. 
 83. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Gonzaga, 520 U.S. at 288. 
 86. Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
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The provision was prefaced with mandatory language—a state plan “must” 
provide—which the court explained unambiguously conferred the rights 
asserted.87 Further, the court explained the provision does not focus on the 
regulated entity; it focuses on the individuals protected.88 It does not describe a 
type of policy goal, but rather it describes a specific requirement guaranteed to 
eligible individuals.89 The court’s analysis regarding this Medicaid provision 
was made “without difficulty.”90 
Other courts have made similar conclusions without difficulty, as there are 
no splits among the circuits when determining whether a particular Medicaid 
provision confers rights to individuals.91 This bodes well for any future 
Medicaid beneficiaries hoping to seek redress in federal court. 
B. Provision Must be Written with Sufficient Clarity that a Court can 
Enforce It 
After it has been established the provision at issue does confer a right to the 
individual plaintiff, the court then turns to examine the characteristic of that 
right.92 The right protected by the provision cannot be so “vague and 
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.93 In Wilder, 
the Supreme Court held a Medicaid provision requiring state plans to provide 
for payment of covered services at rates “reasonable and adequate” to meet the 
costs of such care was not too vague and amorphous to be judicially 
enforceable.94 Although states had significant flexibility to calculate the rates, 
the Court explained such flexibility did not render the provision unenforceable 
by a court.95 It merely affects the standard under which a court would review 
whether the rates are in compliance with the provision.96 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit concluded a Medicaid provision 
requiring state plans to include “reasonable standards” for determining 
eligibility and the extent of medical assistance was too vague and amorphous.97 
The provision did not provide any instruction for how to interpret or implement 
those reasonable standards.98 Therefore, such a right would require a court to 
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delve into the medical necessity of particular types of care, which is exactly the 
type of judicially unenforceable rights contemplated by Blessing.99 
Accordingly, Medicaid provisions granting substantial discretion to states 
are not too vague and amorphous so long as they create standards the court can 
analyze. The standard can be created by the state or some other agency, but it is 
necessary to allow a court to enforce the right guaranteed by the provision at 
issue. Thus, to build a successful Medicaid claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must 
start by asserting an unambiguously conferred right that is not too vague and 
amorphous for a court to enforce it. 
C. Provision Imposes a Binding Obligation on the State 
Finally, for a statutory provision to enjoy the presumption of enforceability 
under § 1983, it must also impose a binding obligation on the states.100 The 
provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather 
than precatory terms.101  
In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court concluded a particular provision of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 merely 
expressed a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment rather than a 
binding obligation.102 The provision at issue was not included in the list of 
conditions for the receipt of federal funds under the Act.103 Instead, the provision 
was included in a list of congressional findings that persons with developmental 
disabilities have a right to “appropriate treatment” in the “least restrictive” 
environment.104 The Court explained Congress often uses legislation to indicate 
preferences that serve to nudge states in a preferred direction.105 Thus, the 
provision was merely the expression of a policy goal to provide developmentally 
disabled citizens with better care.106 
Conversely, in Wilder, the Supreme Court held a Medicaid provision 
requiring that state plans “must” provide for payment of hospital services 
according to reasonable rates was enforceable.107 The Court compared this 
language to that of the provision at issue in Pennhurst and concluded it 
succinctly sets forth a congressional command, which is wholly uncharacteristic 
of a mere policy suggestion or nudge.108  Furthermore, the Secretary of HHS 
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could withhold funds if the state did not comply with the provision.109 Thus, the 
provision was indeed cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms.110 
Taken together, Medicaid provisions can be enforced under § 1983 so long 
as the claim asserts unambiguously conferred rights that are not too vague and 
amorphous and impose a binding obligation on the state. Once those three things 
have been established, the federal right is presumptively enforceable.111  
D. Presumption can be Overcome by the Presence of a Comprehensive 
Enforcement Scheme 
The final hurdle Medicaid beneficiaries must overcome to enforce violations 
of the Act comes in the form of a statutory defense. Even if all three parts of the 
Blessing test are met, enforcement through § 1983 may still be foreclosed if the 
statute containing the specific provision creates a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement.112 
The Supreme Court has only found a comprehensive administrative scheme 
to preclude enforceability in three cases.113 In those cases, the Court explained 
the statutes at issue contained more restrictive remedies than § 1983 and 
contained private judicial remedies for the rights violated.114 Therefore, in those 
situations, the Court concluded Congress did not intend to leave open a more 
expansive remedy under § 1983.115 
For Medicaid, however, the Court held in Wilder that the Act does not have 
a comprehensive enforcement scheme that would foreclose reliance on 
§ 1983.116 The Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to withhold approval of state 
plans or to withhold funds from states not in compliance with federal 
requirements.117 Further, the Act requires states to implement administrative 
procedures whereby individuals can obtain review of state actions affecting 
Medicaid.118 The Court explained neither the Secretary’s authority nor the 
states’ administrative procedures are sufficiently comprehensive to suggest 
individuals cannot rely on § 1983 to enforce various provisions of the Medicaid 
Act.119 The Secretary’s powers are too generalized and state administrative 
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procedures too limited to conclude Congress intended to remove the availability 
of private enforcement in federal court.120 
Therefore, it is clear that Medicaid cases making it to this final part of the 
§ 1983 analysis are likely to succeed. Between 2002 and 2006, twenty-five 
different Medicaid provisions were reviewed by federal courts, and over half 
were found to be enforceable.121 This is particularly encouraging for Medicaid 
beneficiaries as states continue tinkering with state plans to get around various 
federal requirements.122 
IV.  FREEDOM OF CHOICE PROVISION AND § 1983 
Federal courts have applied the Blessing test to § 1983 claims in the 
Medicaid context on numerous occasions.123 Consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s teaching, appellate courts review § 1983 enforceability on a “provision-
by-provision basis.”124  
Six circuit courts of appeals have examined Medicaid’s freedom of choice 
provision, which states: “[A]ny individual eligible for medical assistance … may 
obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or 
person, qualified to perform the service or services required who undertakes to 
provide him such services[.]”125  
All but the Does court from the Eighth Circuit found the provision affords 
Medicaid patients a private right of action under § 1983.126 The other five courts 
of appeals utilized the Blessing test for assessing the § 1983 claims, emphasizing 
different parts of the test to reach their conclusions.  
A. Provision Must Benefit the Plaintiff 
Only those provisions that confer a federal right to the plaintiff can be 
enforced under § 1983.127 First, Medicaid patients are the obvious intended 
beneficiaries of the freedom of choice provision.128 The provision states any 
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Medicaid eligible person may obtain medical assistance from any institution, 
agency, or person qualified to perform that service.129 Further, as noted by the 
Tenth Circuit, Congress enacted another statute that insulates family planning 
services from Medicaid managed care programs, which assures covered patients 
have an unfettered choice of provider for family planning services.130 Thus, 
Congress clearly intended to grant a specific class of beneficiaries—Medicaid-
eligible patients—a right to obtain medical care from the qualified provider of 
their choice.131  
Second, the statute gives any individual eligible for medical assistance a free 
choice of provider for that assistance.132 As explained by the Sixth Circuit, this 
is the kind of individually focused terminology that unambiguously confers an 
individual entitlement under the law.133 
Finally, the individualized language of the provision does not create an 
aggregate plan requirement.134 Instead, it establishes a personal right to which 
all Medicaid patients are entitled.135 The provision is unmistakably phrased in 
terms of the persons benefited.136  
Taken together, Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision clearly meets the 
first prong of the three-part test used for assessing claims under § 1983. 
B. Provision Must be Written with Sufficient Clarity for a Court to Enforce It 
Once it has been established Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision does 
confer rights to Medicaid patients, courts must determine whether that right is 
judicially administrable.137 The Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on this part of 
the test and concluded the provision does supply concrete and objective 
standards of enforcement.138 Any Medicaid recipient is free to choose any 
provider as long as two criteria are met: (1) the provider is qualified to perform 
the requested services, and (2) the provider agrees to provide such services.139 
The court explained these are objective criteria that are well within the judicial 
competence to apply.140 They do not require courts to engage in any balancing 
of competing concerns or subjective policy arguments.141 Courts must only 
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inquire whether an individual was denied the choice of a qualified and willing 
provider, and the answer to this question is likely to be readily apparent.142 
Determining whether a provider is qualified may require more factual 
development, but the term ‘qualified’ is tethered to an objective benchmark: 
qualified to perform the requested services.143 Courts can make that 
determination by drawing on descriptions of the requested services; state 
licensing requirements; the provider’s credentials, licenses, and experience; and 
expert testimony regarding such appropriate credentials.144 This is no different 
from the sorts of qualification or expertise assessments courts routinely make in 
other contexts.145 Thus, the freedom of choice provision is not so “vague and 
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.146 
C. Provision Imposes a Binding Obligation on the State 
Finally, the freedom of choice provision must impose a binding obligation 
on the state.147 The freedom of choice provision is plainly couched in mandatory 
terms.148 It says all states “must provide” in their Medicaid plans that 
beneficiaries may obtain medical care from any qualified and willing 
provider.149  The statute is not merely a directive to a federal agency.150 Rather, 
it requires state plans to allow Medicaid eligible individuals to obtain 
reimbursable medical services from the provider of their choice.151 
D. Presumption can be Overcome by the Presence of a Comprehensive 
Enforcement Scheme 
If all three parts of the test are met, the federal right is presumed to be 
enforceable through § 1983.152 Yet, enforcement through § 1983 may still be 
foreclosed if the statute creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme 
incompatible with individual enforcement.153 The Seventh Circuit explained 
nothing in the Medicaid Act suggests Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy 
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under § 1983.154 Although the Secretary of HHS can shut off state funding, that 
is not a comprehensive enforcement scheme.155 The administrative approval 
process for plan amendments does not provide an avenue for beneficiaries to 
vindicate their freedom of choice rights.156 Moreover, Congress did not provide 
a means of private redress within the Medicaid Act, and private enforcement 
under § 1983 in no way interferes with the Secretary’s prerogative to enforce 
compliance with particular provisions using her administrative authority.157 
Thus, based on Supreme Court precedent, the Medicaid Act’s administrative 
scheme is not sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent 
to withdraw the private remedy under § 1983.158 
Accordingly, together, a majority of circuit courts that have analyzed 
whether Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision confers a right enforceable 
under § 1983 have found that it does.159 
V.  DOES V. GILLESPIE 
In 2017, the Eighth Circuit addressed whether the freedom of choice 
provision conferred a private right enforceable under § 1983.160 In 2015, the 
Governor of Arkansas directed the Arkansas Department of Human Services to 
terminate its Medicaid provider agreements with Planned Parenthood.161 The 
Governor’s directive came on the heels of the publication of videos purporting 
to show Planned Parenthood employees discussing the sale of fetal tissue for 
profit.162 
Planned Parenthood declined to file an administrative appeal with the 
state.163 Rather, Planned Parenthood identified three affected patients, and those 
patients sued the Department’s Director seeking a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the termination of the provider agreements.164 The plaintiffs claimed the 
Department violated Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision when it excluded 
Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid program for reasons unrelated to its 
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fitness to provide medical services.165 The plaintiffs claimed the freedom of 
choice provision creates a judicially enforceable right that can be enforced under 
§ 1983.166 The district court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding the 
free choice of provider provision did create a private right enforceable under 
§ 1983.167 The Department appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit.168 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit found the freedom of choice provision does 
not create an unambiguously conferred right and Medicaid has a comprehensive 
enforcement scheme that forecloses enforcement through § 1983.169 
A. Provision Must Benefit the Plaintiff 
Rather than assess the freedom of choice provision in isolation to determine 
if it creates an enforceable right, the Eighth Circuit broke with Supreme Court 
precedent and analyzed the entire statutory scheme as a whole.170 The court 
explained the focus of the Medicaid Act is two steps removed from the interests 
of the patients seeking services from a Medicaid provider.171 The Secretary of 
HHS approves state plans that fulfill “conditions specified in subsection (a),” 
which includes some eighty-three conditions—including the freedom of choice 
provision.172 Thus, the statute—as a whole—is phrased as a directive to the 
federal agency charged with approving state Medicaid plans.173 The court 
reasoned it is not a conferral of rights upon the beneficiaries, because it does not 
focus on particular individuals.174 Although a subsidiary provision ultimately 
benefits particular individuals, the court explained statutes phrased as directives 
to federal agencies typically do not confer enforceable rights on the 
individuals.175 
Furthermore, the court concluded the provision has an aggregate focus.176 
The Secretary is directed to discontinue payments to a state if she finds the 
failure to comply substantially with the conditions specified in subsection (a).177 
The Eighth Circuit previously held statutes that link funding to “substantial” 
compliance with its conditions counsels against the creation of individual 
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rights.178 Focusing on substantial compliance is tantamount to focusing on the 
aggregate practices of the funding recipient.179 Thus, the court concluded the 
freedom of choice provision was part of a substantial compliance funding 
condition, which suggested it had an aggregate focus.180 
Taken together, the court concluded Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision 
does not create an enforceable federal right under § 1983.181 
B. Presumption can be Overcome by the Presence of a Comprehensive 
Enforcement Scheme 
Although the inquiry could have ended there, the court goes on to analyze 
whether the Medicaid Act has a comprehensive enforcement scheme 
incompatible with individual enforcement through § 1983.182 The court noted 
Congress expressly conferred another means of enforcing compliance with the 
freedom of choice provision—the withholding of federal funds by the 
Secretary.183 Further, providers have the right to appeal an exclusion from the 
Medicaid program.184 Because other sections of the Medicaid Act provide 
mechanisms to enforce the provision at issue, it is reasonable to conclude 
Congress did not intend to create an enforceable right for individual patients 
under § 1983.185 Additionally, the court explained it would “result in a curious 
system” if a patient could litigate the qualifications of a provider in federal court 
at the same time the provider is going through the administrative appeals 
process.186 It could result in parallel ligation and inconsistent results, providing 
further support for the court’s conclusion that the Medicaid Act had foreclosed 
private enforcement through § 1983.187 
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit became the first appellate court to hold 
Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision does not confer an individual federal 
right enforceable under § 1983.188 
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IV.  THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IGNORED BINDING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT TO 
REACH ITS CONCLUSION IN DOES V. GILLESPIE 
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion and analysis is concerning for a couple reasons. 
First, the court ignored established Supreme Court precedent as to how the 
Blessing test must be applied. Second, the court heavily relied on dicta from the 
Supreme Court to reach its conclusion. Accordingly, the court in Does relied on 
dicta from the Supreme Court to re-write well-established, long applied § 1983 
analysis for Medicaid cases, setting up a circuit split and positioning Does to be 
the case that gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to potentially close the 
door on all §1983 private rights of action in Medicaid cases. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Analysis of § 1983 in Wilder is Still Binding 
Precedent 
In concluding the freedom of choice provision does not create an 
enforceable right under § 1983, the Eighth Circuit heavily relied on dicta from a 
recent case from the Supreme Court—Armstrong v. Exceptional Child 
Center.189 There, the plaintiffs sued under the Supremacy Clause, not § 1983, 
and the Court ultimately determined the Supremacy Clause did not grant them a 
private right of action.190 The Court goes on examine the claim under the § 1983 
framework, and, as the Court noted, the assertion of rights under § 1983 was not 
at issue in the case.191 Because the Court’s discussion of § 1983 was not 
necessary to the result regarding the Supremacy Clause, it is considered dicta.192 
This distinction bears great importance, as holdings set binding precedent, 
influencing future decisions of lower courts, while dicta has no similar 
precedential value.193 The reliance on holdings rather than dicta serves as the 
backbone of the U.S. judicial system, as courts rely on holdings to resolve cases 
and make law.194 By promulgating law through dicta that looks like a holding, 
judges exercise lawmaking power they do not possess.195 Further, by accepting 
dicta as binding law, judges fail to discharge their responsibility to resolve cases 
based on the precise question at hand.196 
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s discussion of § 1983 in Armstrong does 
not constitute binding precedent. Still, the Eighth Circuit opted to ignore actual 
binding precedent set forth in Wilder and relied on the assertions from 
Armstrong anyway. 
First, in assessing the intended beneficiary of the freedom of choice 
provision, the Eighth Circuit stated the focus of the Medicaid Act is two steps 
removed from the interests of patients seeking services from Medicaid 
providers.197 The court quoted directly from Armstrong’s discussion of § 1983 
and concluded “[i]t is phrased as a directive to the federal agency charged with 
approving state Medicaid plans, not as a conferral of the right to sue upon the 
beneficiaries of the State’s decision to participate in Medicaid.”198 
As previously explained, this language from Armstrong is dicta and does not 
constitute precedent that must be followed by lower courts. Further, and 
potentially more important, the § 1983 discussion in Armstrong is not signed on 
by a majority of the justices.199 Justice Scalia penned the Armstrong opinion, but 
only Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas joined his discussion of Medicaid 
claims arising under § 1983.200 Justice Breyer joined the majority regarding 
Armstrong’s actual holding, but he declined to so join the discussion regarding 
§ 1983.201 Not only is this discussion considered dicta, Justice Scalia was unable 
to obtain a majority of justices to agree with his stance regarding § 1983 and 
Medicaid. Accordingly, it is far from the type of binding precedent the Eighth 
Circuit would be obligated to follow. 
Second, the Eighth Circuit held the freedom of choice provision had an 
aggregate rather than individual focus, because it is merely part of a substantial 
compliance regime.202 As noted by the Supreme Court in Blessing and many 
decisions since, courts are required to assess the Medicaid provision at issue in 
isolation.203 The Eighth Circuit ignored this axiom and opted instead to assess 
the entire statutory scheme as a whole.204 The court emphasized the Secretary 
can discontinue payments to states if he finds a state fails to comply substantially 
with all the provisions listed in § 1396a, which includes the freedom of choice 
provision.205 In Wilder, the Supreme Court held a substantial compliance 
regime—on its own—could not suggest an aggregate focus.206 The Court in its 
discussion of § 1983 in Armstrong stated the broad application of Wilder should 
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be narrowed to cover only those ambiguously conferred rights, but it did not 
overturn Wilder nor did it express disagreement with its conclusion regarding 
substantial compliance regimes. 207 It merely clarified exactly when the Wilder 
test should be applied.208 In fact, the Supreme Court has routinely relied on the 
principles established in Wilder in its subsequent decisions applying the Blessing 
test.209 
The Eighth Circuit, however, interpreted Armstrong’s narrowing language 
as overruling Wilder. 210 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit completely ignored 
Wilder in light of Armstrong and held Medicaid’s substantial compliance 
regime—alone—suggested it has an aggregate focus.211 Yet again, the Eighth 
Circuit treated dicta as binding precedent. On this issue, however, it went further 
by replacing actual binding precedent with dicta. In so doing, the Eighth Circuit 
exercised lawmaking power it does not possess and created bad, flawed law 
regarding Medicaid claims arising under § 1983.212 
B. The Eighth Circuit Ignored Settled Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
Regarding § 1983 Claims 
As established by the Supreme Court, § 1983 claims must be broken down 
into “manageable analytic bites” in order to be properly assessed.213 Between 
2002 and 2016, federal courts have reviewed twenty-five Medicaid provisions, 
and they were all assessed on a provision-by-provision basis.214 In Does, 
however, the Eighth Circuit ignored this analytical framework and chose to look 
at the Medicaid Act as a whole.215 Although statutes are normally interpreted as 
a whole,216 § 1983 claims require courts to focus on the specific statutory 
provision at issue.217 Thus, the Eighth Circuit ignored binding precedent—
again—and applied the wrong test for statutory interpretation of § 1983 claims. 
C. Implications of the Does v. Gillespie Opinion 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Does v. Gillespie is certainly concerning for 
Medicaid patients hoping to enforce the freedom of choice provision through 
§ 1983. Potentially more concerning, however, is the way in which the court 
reached its conclusion. The court misinterpreted and ignored binding precedent. 
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When faced with as much § 1983 precedent as currently exists, the Eighth 
Circuit managed to miss the forest for the trees. It latched on to dicta from the 
Supreme Court, ultimately leading it to be the only appellate court to hold 
Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision does not confer an individual right 
enforceable under § 1983. Thus, a circuit split was born. 
The biggest concern for Medicaid advocates moving forward is the potential 
for the Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split against Medicaid patients 
seeking to enforce the freedom of choice provision. Although Does relied on 
dicta, the language still represents views held by some of the Supreme Court 
justices. We do not know when or if those views will come to represent a 
majority on the Court, but it may happen sooner than anticipated now that 
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have joined the bench.218 The Supreme Court 
could remove the ability for any Medicaid recipients to enforce various 
provisions of the Act through § 1983, thereby removing the one avenue for 
recourse currently available to Medicaid recipients. 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the split among 
the circuit courts.219 Rather than expressly disavow the Eighth Circuit’s 
improper analysis and conclusions, the opinion remains undisturbed. For now, 
claimants can still rely on § 1983 to secure their freedom of choice—so long as 
they are outside the reach of the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction. It is unclear how 
long the Supreme Court will allow this divergence in the law to exist, but 
hopefully it can and will be resolved in favor of Medicaid recipients. The right 
to choose the provider of your choice is vital, and federal courts are the only 
forum in which to have that right protected. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Medicaid has been in place for more than fifty years, and the Act provides 
much needed health care benefits to the indigent and categorically needy. 220 
Over the years, Congress has ensured Medicaid recipients have the freedom to 
choose providers of their choice.221 As states have attempted to threaten that 
choice, federal courts have stepped in to protect patients.222 The ability for 
Medicaid patients to seek redress in federal court is particularly important in 
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light of HHS’s limited enforcement authority and the inadequate administrative 
remedies included in the Medicaid Act itself. 
The recent decision from the Eighth Circuit is particularly concerning 
because it seems to limit patients’ ability to utilize federal courts as a means of 
redress when states are not acting in compliance with protections afforded by 
federal law.223 In setting up a circuit split, the Eighth Circuit opened a path to 
allowing the Supreme Court to close courthouse doors to all § 1983 claims in 
Medicaid cases. The Eighth Circuit’s, decision, however, was misguided. It did 
not rely on binding precedent and misapplied proper § 1983 rules of analysis. 
As these cases continue rising up through federal courts, Medicaid advocates 
are left hoping the Supreme Court either expressly repudiates the Eighth Circuit 
for its faulty analysis. Either way, a lot is at stake for Medicaid beneficiaries’ 
ability to secure their freedom of choice. 
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